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1. INTRODUCTION 
Like most OECD countries, Japan is experiencing 
substantial changes in its socio-economic structure due to the 
growing number of low-wage workers and the rapid pace of 
population ageing. While this necessitates a series of reforms 
in public programs targeted at such disadvantaged households, 
public funds for such programs are limited, restricting the 
scope of possible reforms. Given this lack of resources, it is 
important to achieve higher efficiency in welfare program 
implementation. We would then naturally be interested in 
examining the performance of welfare organization and 
exploring factors that may affect the efficient implementation 
of its programs. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of 
the standard tools used for examining efficiency. While a 
number of DEA studies examine public sector activities, those 
addressing social assistance are limited (Martin 2002, Ayala 
et al. 2008, Enache 2012, Habibov and Fan 2010, Broersma et 
al. 2013). This may partly be due to the traditional reluctance 
to conduct economic evaluation as part of social policy (Ayala 
et al. 2008). In addition, DEA studies on social assistance 
address varied concerns. Some are interested in the efficiency 
of welfare offices providing social assistance to a given size of 
welfare recipients (Martin 2002, Ayala et al. 2008), while 
others focus on the efficiency in social expenditure in reducing 
poverty level (Enache 2010, Habibov and Fan 2012). The 
efficiency of social assistance spending across different socio-
economic environments has also been studied (Broersma et al. 
2013). In this study, we examine the efficiency of welfare 
offices, not the efficiency of welfare spending. This focus 
means that the studies of Martin (2002) and Ayala et al. (2008) 
are of direct relevance to our analysis. Martin (2002) may be 
among the first to have applied DEA to welfare programs, 
using the data from social assistance offices in Oregon. In the 
same vein, Ayala et al. (2008) evaluate the efficiency of 41 
social services agencies in Madrid, Spain. 
We aim to improve on these studies by investigating the 
efficiency of social welfare offices in the Japanese system of 
local public administration. The Japanese case indeed merits 
analysis. First, no studies have utilized DEA to investigate 
efficiency issues in the Japanese social assistance program. 
Second, data are available for the Japanese case, pertaining to 
caseloads by category for multiple output variables and public 
employment by type for input variables, both at the municipal 
level. We also take advantage of this availability to conduct a 
second-stage regression (2SR) analysis with the efficiency 
score for social welfare offices, to examine the factors 
influencing the efficiency of municipal programs. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
Japanese system of social assistance and activities of its social 
welfare offices to set up an input–output model that yields 
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DEA efficiency scores. It then calculates relevant efficiency 
scores and conducts an analysis. Section 3 then explores the 
effects of external factors on the efficiency scores. For this 
purpose, it utilizes the 2SR analysis. In so doing, it elaborates 
on the issues concerning the 2SR and employ several 
estimation methods proposed in the literature to obtain a set of 
estimates and compare the results. Section 4 extends the 
analysis in Section 3 to perform quantile regressions. It does 
so with an anticipation that the external factors exert different 
impacts on the efficiency, depending on the level of the latter. 
Section 5 concludes this study. 
 
2. EFFICIENCY SCORES 
A DEA study starts by specifying decision-making units 
(DMUs) and variables for inputs and outputs. This section 
specifies the DMUs and the variables for inputs and outputs 
for the current analysis. Finding the relevant inputs and 
outputs for welfare office activities requires an examination of 
the nature of the actual system. It therefore elaborates on our 
DEA model, while discussing the institutional mechanism of 
the Japanese system of social assistance. 
 
2.1. DMUs 
Public Assistance (PA), Seikatsu Hogo in Japanese, acts as 
the last social safety net covering those excluded from the 
upper layers of social programs and is implemented by local 
governments in the country. The Public Assistance Law (PAL) 
allows the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) 
to mandate local governments to implement PA programs. 
There are two levels of local government in Japan: prefectures 
and municipalities (cities, towns, villages, and Tokyo 
Metropolitan special wards (TMSWs)). The Social Welfare 
Law (SWL) requires cities, TMSWs, and prefectures to set up 
social welfare offices, through which they implement social 
programs including PA. The SWL does not require towns and 
villages to do so. In towns and villages that do not have their 
own welfare offices, prefectural welfare offices cover their 
respective population. We thus use 658 cities in 2010 as our 
DMUs, excluding villages and towns that have their own 
social welfare offices. Note that we could not utilize all those 
cities that have their own welfare offices, since some of them 
lack all the necessary data required for our analysis. Notice 
also that since a small number of cities have more than one 
social welfare office, the number of DMUs is not necessarily 
identical to the number of individual welfare offices. 
Nonetheless, we do not consider this a major problem, as 
municipalities, not individual welfare offices, make decisions 
on human resource allocation concerning welfare offices. 
 
2.2. Outputs and Inputs 
A function of social welfare offices is to provide PA for 
those who are in need of it. The PA intends to guarantee the 
minimum cost of living for Japanese citizens. Through the 
PAL, the central government sets uniform procedures for 
localities to follow when they provide PA benefits. That is, 
local governments do not set the eligibility standard or the 
benefit levels for their PA programs. The PA benefits are equal 
to the minimum cost of living in excess of what an individual 
earns with his/her best effort. The MHLW determines the 
minimum costs of living, allowing for differences in the cost 
due to regional price differences, the formula for which 
uniformly applies across the nation. To receive the benefits, 
applicants are supposed to exhaust their available resources. 
The PA program therefore requires local welfare offices to 
conduct a careful examination, or a “means test,” of the 
financial situation of the applicants. 
It is then natural to employ welfare caseloads (the number 
of recipients obtaining assistance) as our choice of the output 
variable. Indeed, Martin (2002) and Ayala et al. (2008) make 
analogous choices. However, they also use other variables. In 
addition to caseloads, Martin (2002) uses the number of job 
placements, successful exits (the number of recipients who 
have been off assistance during the last 18 months at least), 
and child support benefits. Meanwhile, Ayala et al. (2008) 
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additionally use the median length of processing applications. 
Our omission of these additional outputs may be justifiable in 
the Japanese institutional context. First, Japanese welfare 
offices do not implement active labor market programs that 
are comparable to those in other OECD countries. Second, 
child support benefits are irrelevant for the Japanese case since 
another municipal branch is responsible for them. Third, 
processing time may be reflected in the caseload size, since 
shorter processing time leads to a larger caseload size in a 
given time period. As we mentioned above, the activities of 
Japanese welfare offices center on means testing, delivery of 
benefits, and monitoring of the recipients. 
While we focus on welfare caseloads as the output in the 
current study, a single type of caseload may not suffice. Since 
the needs of the PA recipients vary depending on their 
characteristics, the services required for different categories of 
PA recipients must also be different. Fortunately, we have 
access to disaggregated caseload data for five categories of 
recipient households: those made only of (i) the elderly (those 
consisting only of those aged 65 years and above), and those 
headed by (ii) single mothers, (iii) the handicapped, (iv) the 
sick and injured, and (v) others. The categorization is 
lexicographic, starting from (i) and proceeding to (v). In 
FY2010, elderly households constituted the largest proportion 
(43%), followed by households headed by the injured and sick 
(23%) and the disabled (11%). The remaining consist of 
households headed by single mothers (8%) and others (16%). 
These categories of recipients apparently require different 
types of casework. We therefore use their caseloads as 
different multiple (five) outputs in our analysis. 
A natural choice for the inputs is the size of employment at 
welfare offices, since “labor” is a straightforward input in this 
production process. Indeed, Ayala et al. (2008) and analogous 
DEA studies on public employment offices (Sheldon 2003, 
Vassiliev et al. 2006, Althin et al. 2010) use the sizes of office 
staff by type as prime inputs. Our data allow us to differentiate 
them into caseworkers and administrative staff. It is also 
natural to consider “capital” type production inputs. For 
example, Martin (2002) considers the number of offices, while 
Althin et al. (2010) employ office space. However, the data for 
office space are not available for the current case. We thus 
have to content ourselves with the use of single types of input, 
i.e., labor. This may not be a serious problem though, since 
labor is more relevant than capital for the analysis of welfare 
programs, given the labor-intensive character of social 
services (Ayala et al. 2008) 
 
2.3. Results 
Given the nature of the PA system in Japan, the size of the 
needy is largely exogenous for municipalities. Although it 
might be possible for welfare offices to implement programs 
to reduce these needs, such changes are indeed slim. Thus, the 
efficiency concept in this analysis concerns how efficiently 
welfare offices manage a given level of caseloads without 
reducing the services for the recipients. We thus employ the 
input-oriented efficiency score E. Formally, the score E is the 
maximal contraction of all inputs x ((i) caseworkers and (ii) 
other staff) that allows us to produce a given combination of 
outputs y (caseloads for (i) the elderly, (ii) single mothers, (iii) 
the handicapped, (iv) the sick and injured, and (v) others). That 
is, E  min{E > 0 | (Ex, y)  T} where T is a technology set. 
The measurement thus utilizes the Charnes–Cooper–Rhodes 
(CCR) model (Charnes et al. 1978) to obtain the score E based 
on the Farrell index of input efficiency. 
A linear programing exercise yields three types of 
efficiency scores (EVRS, ECRS, EDRS), being based respectively 
on the concepts of variable returns to scale (VRS), constant 
returns to scale (CRS), and decreasing returns to scale (DRS). 
Figure 1 shows their kernel distributions. There are noticeable 
differences between the scores based on variable returns to 
scales (EVRS) and those based on the other two types of returns 
(ECRS, EDRS). As expected, EVRS tend to yield higher efficiency 
scores. The distribution of EVRS has an average of 0.459 with a 
standard deviation (s.d.) of 0.191 and ranges from 0.133 to 
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unity. Meanwhile, the distribution of ECRS (EDRS) has an 
average of 0.376 (0.387) with an s.d. of 0.183 (0.196) and 
ranges from 0.064 (0.064) to unity. 
We perform the bootstrapped tests for returns-to-scale as 
indicated by Simar and Wilson (2002, 2011), using the (i) ratio 
of means, (ii) mean of ratios, and (iii) mean of ratios of DEA 
scores less unity (the number of replications is 3,000). The 
tests reject both the null hypotheses of constant returns and 
decreasing returns to scale at the standard levels of statistical 
significance. In the next analysis, we therefore proceed with 
EVRS, the scores based on variable returns to scale. There are 
indeed large differences in the efficiency score among 
municipalities. Only 29 municipalities (4.4%) are located on 
the frontier with a full score of unity, while the other 629 
municipalities (95.6%) are off the frontier. As such, Figure 1 
suggests sizable room for efficiency improvement. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distributions of efficient scores 
 
 
3. EXTERNAL EFFECTS ON EFFICIENCY 
3.1. Adjustments for Environmental/External Factors 
In the previous suction, we noted the large variations in the 
efficiency scores among municipalities. We might then rank 
individual DMUs according to the efficiency scores so that the 
                                                     
1 There are three approaches to such adjustments (Cordero et al., 2009). First, 
one-stage models regard external factors as additional inputs in the standard 
DEA model but obtain the efficiency scores with special restrictions on them 
(Banker and Morey 1986, Ruggiero 1996). Second, two-stage models obtain 
the efficiency scores without external factors in the first stage and regress the 
less efficient DMUs could use them as a benchmark to 
improve their efficiency. However, doing so may not be 
appropriate since Japanese social welfare offices apparently 
operate in non-homogeneous environments, which are likely 
to exert different impacts on the performance of the DMUs. In 
other words, the “inefficiency” may originate from factors 
outside the control of the DMUs, thus limiting the scope of 
efficiency improvement that Figure 1 may otherwise indicate. 
The ranking of the DMUs would then require adjustments of 
the efficiency scores that allow for different external 
(environmental) factors.1 
While the evaluation of individual DMUs is the primary 
objective of DEA, it may also be meaningful to examine if and 
how external factors affect the efficiency. Indeed, it is 
important to examine factors that affect PA implementation at 
social welfare offices and to find the directions and degrees of 
their impacts on their efficiency. For example, if the central 
government can change such external factors, it could 
improve the overall efficiency of municipal PA programs. For 
this reason, Section 3-4 discusses two-stage models but leaves 
the adjustment of efficiency scores to future studies. 
 
3.2. The Second-stage Regression Model 
We specify our 2SR model as a linear-in-parameters form. 
i i iE u  z β     (1) 
where Ei is an efficiency measure obtained in the first stage, zi 
is a vector of external factors,  is a vector of coefficients, ui is 
an error term, and i indexes the DMUs. For the efficiency 
measure (i.e., dependent variable), we alternatively use the 
efficiency score (EVRS) and its reciprocal (distance function 
1/EVRS). For the factors in z, we consider municipal population 
(in log), surface area (in log), the Fiscal Capacity Index (FCI), 
the Obligatory Expenses Ratio (OER), the Local Allocation 
Tax (LAT) received (as the binary variable), and caseload 
scores on a set of external factors in the second stage (Ray 1991). They then 
use the second-stage estimates to adjust the efficiency scores. Third, adjusted 
values models utilize the estimates for the effects on slacks of external factors 
to adjust the values of discretionary variables and obtain the DEA efficiency 
scores with these slack-adjusted values (Muñiz 2002, Fried et al. 1999). 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
VRS CRS DRS
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growth rate. The variables are defined later in this section. We 
select these six factors for the following reasons. 
First, as the literature on local public finance shows, there 
exist economies of scale in local expenditures up to a certain 
level of the population (Duncombe and Yinger 1993). Larger 
localities tend to provide more categories of services than 
smaller ones (Oates 1988), yielding economies of scope in 
more populous municipalities. Using the savings from these 
two scale economies, localities with a higher population could 
invest more resources so that welfare offices may become 
more efficient. These lines of reasoning suggest that a larger 
population would lead to higher efficiencies. 
Second, the space of a given locality should also matter. 
Since caseworkers visit their PA recipients within a given 
period, the more widespread the residences of the recipients, 
the more the time spent on their cases. Since more time spent 
on a case implies that the caseworker will handle a fewer 
number of cases, spacious jurisdictions denote less efficiency. 
Third, fiscal capacity is also a concern. The Japanese 
government estimates an index for the “fiscal capacity” of 
localities with the data obtained from its system of central 
grants (the LAT). The amount of LAT a locality receives is the 
non-negative difference between its Standard Fiscal Demand 
(SFD) and Standard Fiscal Revenue (SFR). The SFD 
estimates the level of local expenditures required to maintain 
the standard level of public services, while the SFR estimates 
standardized local revenues. The system defines the FCI as the 
three-year average of the ratio of the SFR to the SFD. Another 
index of fiscal capacity is the OER, which shows a percentage 
of expenses that a locality cannot easily adjust, including 
personnel expenses, local debt-service payments, and other 
expenses the central government requires them to spend. 
Larger fiscal capacity implies more fiscal abundance, from 
which localities could spare more resources for providing 
welfare offices with more caseworkers and administrative 
staff for a given level of caseloads. This may or may not imply 
that a larger fiscal capacity would lead to lower efficiency. 
However, a drawback in using the FCI as fiscal capacity is 
its negative correlation with the LAT grant a locality receives. 
The LAT may adversely affect the efficiency of local spending 
(e.g., Otsuka et al. 2014), which then suggests that a large 
value of FCI may be associated with a smaller value of the 
efficiency score. To control the effect of receiving transfers, 
the regression below allows for the receipt of LAT grants. In 
addition to its claimed adverse effects, the LAT compensates 
the local burden of PA expenditures. While the central 
government disburses 75% of local PA expenditure with 
matching grants to localities, the SFD allows for the rest of the 
cost. In other words, while LAT recipients enjoy the increase 
in PA benefits covered by the central grants, the non-recipients 
have to meet 25% of that increase out of their own pockets. 
This would then imply that receiving LAT grants adversely 
affects the efficiency score. 
Lastly, the speed of caseload changes affects the efficiency. 
Roughly speaking, efficiency is the ratio of output over input. 
Since inputs are the numbers of caseworkers and other staff 
members, the efficiency tends to increase if the adjustments of 
the inputs are slow relative to the changes in the outputs. The 
analysis seen below allows for this aspect by including the rate 
of increase in PA caseloads from FY2008 to FY2009 as the 
measured input at the beginning of FY2010. 
 
3.3. Econometric Issues 
It is important when estimating 2SR models to recognize 
that DEA scores obtained in the first stage are estimates (Simar 
and Wilson 2007). We can frame the issue as a typical case of 
measurement errors in the dependent variables (Wooldridge 
2010, 7677). The 2SR typically assumes the following data 
generation process (DGP).  
*
i i iE   z β     (2) 
where Ei* is the true value of the efficiency score. Since Ei*is 
not observable, the estimated score Ei surrogates Ei*. Defining 
the measurement error in the dependent variable as si  Ei  
Ei*, we can express Equation (2) as Equation (1) with ui  si + 
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i. If Ei is consistent, si approaches zero (i.e., Ei approaches Ei*) 
as the sample size approaches infinity. Since Ei is indeed 
consistent (Banker 1993, Kneip et al. 1998), the existence of 
si does not affect the asymptotic distribution of estimators for 
. In other words, treating DEA scores as estimates does not 
pose an issue if we have a suitably large sample. 
   On the other hand, we are not sure how large a suitable 
sample would be, since the convergence of Ei to Ei* becomes 
slower as the number of inputs and outputs in the DEA model 
increases (Kneip et al. 1998). This “curse of dimensionality” 
might make the asymptotic approximation fail even with a 
relatively large sample. In addition, the very calculation of 
DEA scores for individual DMUs creates correlations among 
them (Xue and Harker 1999).2 The curse of dimensionality 
and the correlation among the scores makes ui non-spherical 
though si is a finite sample, even if i is spherical (i.e., i.i.d.). 
Furthermore, it is very likely that i is also non-spherical since 
we typically use a sample of the cross-sectional data. We thus 
adjust the covariance matrix of  estimates to arrive at a valid 
inference. As the pattern of non-spherical error u is unknown, 
our choices include utilizing a heteroskedastic consistent 
covariance matrix estimator (McDonald 2009) or 
bootstrapping the covariance matrix (Simar and Wilson 2007).  
Another econometric issue concerns the method to estimate 
Equation (1). The most straightforward is the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator (Ray 1991), which does not 
explicitly allow for the fact that the dependent variable is 
bounded: EVRS  (0, 1] or 1/EVRS  [1, ). To allow for these 
bounds, Bjurek et al. (1992) estimate the 2SR model with 
censoring at unity (Tobit estimator). While a number of studies 
use the method, the Tobit estimator also has its shortcomings 
when applied to the 2SR (McDonald 2009). Therefore, Simar 
and Wilson (2007) model it as a linear model with truncation, 
whereas Hoff (2007) and Ramalho et al. (2010) depart from 
the linear specification to utilize the fractional response (FR) 
                                                     
2 Perturbations of DMUs lying on the estimated frontier change the scores of 
some other DMUs. 
model devised by Papke and Wooldrige (1996). 
 
3.4. Estimation Results 
To estimate Equation (1), we employ all the four models: (i) 
OLS, (ii) Tobit, (iii) truncation, and (iv) FR models.3 The FR 
model is not applicable to cases that employ 1/EVRS as their 
dependent variable. For the covariance matrices of these 
estimators, we bootstrap the standard errors with 3,000 
replications to allow for their possible inconsistency and finite 
sample bias. In addition, we utilize the double bootstrap 
procedure (Algorithm #2) by Simar and Wilson (2007), which 
essentially replaces the original EVRS with bias-corrected 
bootstrapped EVRS when bootstrapping the truncated 
regression of Equation (1). The number of replications for the 
bias-corrected EVRS and 2SR is 200 and 3,000 respectively. 
Note that, since this method is not computationally applicable 
to the efficiency score with bounds (0, 1] (Simar and Wilson 
2008, Besstremyannaya and Simm 2015), we apply it only to 
the case with the distance function. 
Table 1 lists the results. The first four columns are cases 
with the efficiency score and the last four are cases with its 
reciprocal (distance function). These results are robust in the 
sense that the statistical significances do not change over 
different estimation methods for a given dependent variable 
(EVRS or 1/EVRS). In all the cases, population, surface area, the 
FCI, and the LAT received are all statistically significant, 
while the OER and caseload changes are not. The results show 
that larger population, smaller surface area, lower fiscal 
capacity, and the non-receipt of LAT grants tend to increase 
the efficiency as expected, whereas the other two variables do 
not affect the efficiency. In particular, the insignificance on the 
caseload changes imply that the inputs (caseworkers and other 
staff members) adjust smoothly against the changes in the 
outputs (PA caseloads). 
Furthermore, the marginal effects of these external factors 
3 We use the logistic distribution for the cumulative distribution that shapes the 
fractional response. 
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are almost similar among the E-OLS, E-Tobit, and E-FR and 
between the D-OLS and D-Tobit models (where E and D 
denote efficiency and distance respectively). On the other 
hand, the differences in values with truncated regression and 
those from other models are rather conspicuous, albeit not so 
large, with statistically significant coefficients. These 
differences are likely due to different samples rather than the 
different DGP or estimation method (truncated or not), as E-
TRC and D-TRC exclude 29 DMUs that have full efficiency 
scores of unity. In addition, while D-TRC/SW does not 
exclude them, it uses bootstrapped bias-corrected scores 
whose values are not only different from the standard ones but 
also differ from unity. 
McDonald (2009) argues that the idea of efficiency scores 
as estimates of “true” scores, as suggested by Simar and 
Wilson (2007), “would lead to considerable complexity and 
perhaps only minor changes in inference.” Qualitatively, his 
argument seems to apply to our cases. All the estimation 
methods, including OLS, show that larger population, smaller 
surface area, lower FCI, and non-receipt of LAT grants would 
increase the efficiency, whereas the others do not affect the 
efficiency. Quantitatively, however, the results are somewhat 
different. In particular, the effects of population, FCI, and LAT 
receipt differ with the truncation regressions, although the 
effect of surface area does not change much. 
 
Table 1: Estimation results 
Dependent variable Efficiency score (EVRS) Distance function (1/EVRS) 
Models E-OLS E-Tobit E-FR E-TC D-OLS D-Tobit D-TC D-TC/SW 
ln(population) 
  .075***   .078***   .075***   .061***  .269***  .294***  .368***  .362*** 
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.011) (.062) (.067) (.104) (.113) 
ln(area) 
 .027***  .028***  .027***  .026***   .143***   .149***   .229***   .246*** 
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.007) (.043) (.046) (.071) (.083) 
Fiscal capacity index (FCI) 
 .264***  .270***  .263***  .246***  1.267***  1.320***  1.929***  2.070*** 
(.056) (.057) (.056) (.043) (.294) (.301) (.448) (.501) 
Obligatory expense ratio (OER) 
.143 .149 .143 .109 1.168 1.222 1.751 1.967 
(.166) (.173) (.170) (.145) (.947) (.979) (1.431) (1.659) 
LAT receipt 
 .140***  .145***  .140***  .108***  .561**  .602**  .750*  1.000** 
(.049) (.051) (.049) (.064) (.274) (.285) (.436) (.506) 
Caseload growth 
.021 .016 .022 .064 .046 .082 .082 .098 
(.095) (.099) (.096) (.088) (.472) (.491) (.691) (.794) 
Constant 
.075 .099 
 
.039 4.538***   4.729***   4.852***  4.904*** 
(.171) (.181) (.158) (.895) (.949) (1.438) (1.609) 
Notes: (1) The sample sizes are 658 for E-OLS, E-Tobit, E-FR, D-OLS, and D-Tobit. (2) Truncation regressions (E-TRC and D-TRC) exclude 
DMUs with EVRS (1/ EVRS) = 1, trimming the sample size down to 629. (3) ***, **, and * indicate p  .01, .01 < p  .05, and .05 < p  .10 
respectively. (4) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses (3,000 replications). (5) D-TC/SW utilizes the r-DEA package (Simm and 
Besstremyannaya 2015) to obtain the bootstrapped bias-corrected efficiency scores as suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) with 200 
replications, and then uses these scores for the bootstrapped truncated regression with 3,000 replications. (6) E-FR lists the marginal effects 
evaluated at the sample averages. 
 
 
4.  QUANTILE REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS 
4.1. Different Responses along the Quantiles of Efficiency 
All the preceding models, except the FR model, assumed that 
the marginal effects of the external factors on efficiency are 
constant on average. Such effects may plausibly differ among 
DMUs with different levels of efficiency. This section 
therefore conducts the 2SR using quantile regression (QR) to 
address the possible different responses of the efficiency 
scores to the external factors. 
With QR, we can estimate the responses of the efficiency 
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score to changes in the external factors across the conditional 
quantiles of the former. For the QR analysis, we first define a 
conditional quantile function of E as Q(Ei | zi)  F1( | zi), 
where F(| zi) is a c.d.f. of E at quantile , conditioned on a 
given set of external factors zi. We then specify a linear 
regression model as E = z + u, where  is a vector of 
coefficients that vary across quartiles, and ui is the error term. 
The QR estimator for  is a sample analogue of b  argmimb 
E{(E = zb)}, where  is the check function defined as   
1[E  zb > 0] | E  zb | + 1[E  zb  0](1  )| E  zb |. 
This scheme results in a minimand that selects conditional 
quantiles. 
We use the super-efficiency score as the dependent variable. 
The super efficiency score of a given DMU, K, is obtained by 
gauging it against another efficiency frontier calculated with a 
group of DMUs that excludes K (cf. Bogetoft and Otto 2011). 
It equals the standard efficiency score for DMUs that are off 
the frontier, and takes on a value more than unity for DMUs 
that are on the frontier. Since the score can take on a value 
exceeding unity, it is convenient for us to use them as the 
dependent variable of our QR model. Notice, however, we 
may not be able to calculate the super-efficiency scores for all 
DMUs. As we could not obtain the score for one DMU, the 
sample size for the second-stage QR is 657. 
 
4.2. Results 
Table 2 lists the results of the QRs at the 0.15, 0.25, 0.50, 
0.75, and 0.85 quantiles. As a benchmark, we list the OLS 
estimates obtained with super-efficiency scores. The results of 
the OLS model show that the directional impacts of the 
external factors are qualitatively the same as those of the E-
OLS model in Table 1. However, their magnitudes (in 
absolute value) are larger, reflecting the changes in the 
efficiency scores from unity for the DMUs on the frontier. The 
coefficient estimates for the five quantiles are indeed different 
from those of the OLS models. In addition, their coefficient 
values vary across the quantiles. To better understand the 
changes in coefficients across quantiles, Figure 2 plots the 
coefficient estimates at eighteen quantiles (.05, .10, …, .90, 
and .95) along with their 95% confidence intervals. In general, 
the effects tend to increase in absolute value toward the upper 
quantiles if they are largely statistically significant (population, 
surface area, FCI, and LAT), while they seem change 
relatively little if the effects are not statistically significant 
(OER and caseload growth). These findings suggest that the 
impacts on efficiency are larger for those municipalities 
located closer to the edge of the frontier. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, we obtained the Farrell scores of input-
oriented efficiency for municipal PA programs in Japan and 
explored the effects of a set of external factors on the 
efficiency scores. We showed that the efficiency varies across 
municipalities, implying a large potential for efficiency 
improvement. Nonetheless, such disparities may be due to the 
variations in external factors that municipalities cannot control. 
Employing the 2SR analysis with a variety of estimators, we 
then examined how a set of external factors would affect the 
efficiency. Our results indicated that surface area, fiscal 
capacity, and receipt of LAT grants decreased the efficiency, 
while population improved it. Furthermore, a QR analysis 
with super-efficiency scores showed that the marginal effects 
of the external factors on the efficiency would become larger 
in absolute value for the upper quantiles of the efficiency 
scores. This then may imply that when we compare efficiency 
scores among DMUs, we should adjust the scores, taking 
account of their effects across the quantiles of the efficiency 
scores. While there is a large body of literature on the 
adjustment of the efficiency scores to variations in external 
factors (e.g., Cordero et al. 2009), to the best of our knowledge, 
no study explicitly allows for such differentiated effects across 
quantiles. Our next task then would be to elaborate further on 
the QR approach in a 2SR analysis and possibly construct 
adjusted efficiency scores that allow for such quantile effects. 
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Table 2: Estimation results 
 OLS 
Quantile 
.15 .25 .50 .75 .85 
ln(population) 
.098*** .022   .047***   .055***   .083***   .122*** 
(.021) (.017) (.018) (.016) (.017) (.022) 
ln(area) 
.041*** −.017** −.030***  −.028*** −.025  −.046*** 
(.013) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.016) (.016) 
Fiscal capacity index (FCI) 
.361*** −.157*** −.268***  −.194***  −.285***  −.477*** 
(.090) (.052) (.066) (.061) (.082) (.100) 
Obligatory expense ratio (OER) 
.242 .349* .313* .026 .342 .053 
(.251) (.172) (.176) (.198) (.264) (.375) 
LAT receipt 
.161*** −.065 −.097** −.099  −.256***  −.274*** 
(.055) (.042) (.043) (.075) (.097) (.095) 
Caseload growth 
.037 −.039 −.083 −.076 −.064 .265 
(.104) (.155) (.082) (.089) (.160) (.185) 
Constant 
.252 .010 −.040 .164 −.144 −.014 
(.295) (.230) (.237) (.230) (.246) (.321) 
Notes: (1) Sample size is 658. (2) Standard errors are bootstrapped with 3000 replications. (3) ***, **, and * indicate p  .01, .01 < p  .05, 
and .05 < p  .10 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2 Distributions of efficient scores 
Panel A: Population 
 
Panel B: Surface area 
 
Panel C: Fiscal capacity index 
 
Panel D: Obligatory expense ratio 
 
Panel E: LAT receipt 
 
Panel F: Caseload growth 
 
Notes: (1) Solid lines in panels connect the QR coefficient estimates at eighteen quantiles (0.05, 0.10, …, 0.90, and 0.95). (2) The dotted lines show 95% confidence 
intervals of the QR estimates. 
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